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TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY PATH TRACER 
 







Today, most of the traffic that traverses the Internet is encrypted.  Users (e.g., 
clients) and servers are able to exchange data securely using the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocol.  However, there will likely be one or more proxies in the path between a 
client and a server and those proxies are able to change some of the security parameters 
based on, for example, a network security policy.  As a result, a client may not know exactly 
what is happening in the middle.  To address these types of challenges, techniques are 
presented herein that support an extension to the handshake protocol that can request a 
‘trace’ feature along a network path.  All of the different TLS entities in the network can 
recognize the extension and add any changes that they are making to the upstream proposal.  
Advantages of the techniques presented herein include, among other things, helping to 
troubleshoot the TLS policy end-to-end. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Most of the traffic that currently traverses the Internet is encrypted.  Clients and 
servers are able to exchange data securely using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol.  A client and a server negotiate a cipher suite and exchange key parameters to be 
able to derive a symmetric key for bulk encryption purposes.  During such a call flow the 
client thinks that it is talking directly to the server.  In reality, there will be one or more 
proxies in the path between the client and the server and those proxies are able to change 
some of the security parameters based on, for example, the network security policy.  
Proxies can be either transparent or terminating.  The client may not know exactly what is 
happening in the middle.  If the client would like to know the exact treatment that his or 
her connection is getting across the network, today there is no way to know those 
particulars.   Also, if an administrator would like to know what proxies are on a path and 
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what changes are being made between a client and a server from a TLS perspective (e.g., 
for debugging purposes) today there is no way to know those details. 
An exemplary scenario, which follows the narrative that was presented above, may 
be depicted as: 
    Client ---- Proxy1 ---- Internet ----- Proxy2 ---- Server 
To address the types of challenges that were described above, techniques are 
presented herein that support an extension to the handshake protocol that can request a 
‘trace’ feature along a network path.  All of the different TLS entities in the network can 
recognize the extension and add any changes that they are making to the upstream proposal.  
Ultimately, a server receives the modified proposal from a client and recognizes the ‘trace’ 
extension in the client Hello and copies that information to the server Hello and sends it 
back towards the client.  On the way back, the server Hello may be modified (by, for 
example, middle boxes) and those changes will be recorded along the path in the extension 
data.  A client receives the full trace of negotiation parameters along with an indication of 
who changed what.  If an entity does not understand the identified trace extension, they can 
just ignore it and send it as is without dropping it. 
According to aspects of the techniques presented herein, a TLS extension with a 
type that is selected from within the range of codes reserved for private use (65,282 through 
65,535), such as '65,299' for examples discussed herein, may support the tracing of TLS 
parameter changes throughout a network path.  A client may send the type 65,299 extension 
in the client Hello indicating that it would like to see any of the TLS parameters that are 
changed during the traversal to the destination by any proxies or intermediate nodes in the 
path.  A server receives the client Hello, sees the type 65,299 extension, copies the data as 
it is from the type 65,299 extension, and appends it as an extension in the server Hello.  
The server Hello is received by the client which then parses the information. 
The format that is used in the client Hello and the server Hello, according to aspects 
of the techniques presented herein, is as follows: 
<65,299> (extension type) 
  Total length of the extension  
  Proxy Id  
    Type (client Hello/server Hello)  
    Added parameter (+, parameter _id)  
    Subtracted parameter (-, parameter _id) 
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Under aspects of the techniques presented herein an important assumption 
encompasses the absence of any ‘bad actors’ in the network.  A ‘bad actor’ may include, 
for example, any proxy or intermediate nodes which might populate wrong or incorrect 
information or which can remove the type 65,299 extension from a server Hello or a client 
Hello. 
Figure 1, below, depicts elements of the call flow that is associated with an example 
involving client Hello and server Hello artifacts being modified and recorded for an end-
to-end TLS path trace. 
 
Figure 1: Exemplary Call Flow 
 
Various of the techniques presented herein offer a number of advantages including, 
among other things: 
 Serving as an excellent tool for administrators as they work to fine tune the 
policy of a network. 
 Aiding in identifying potential security vulnerabilities on a path. 
 Informing a user as to the proxies that are in a path.  For example, a browser 
may provide this information to a user who is worried about the security of their 
sessions. 
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 Being relatively easy to implement. 
 Being employable just for debugging purposes, thus avoiding any negative 
impact to data path performance. 
 Working in both TLS 1.3 and prior versions or future versions such as, for 
example, the Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) protocol. 
It is also important to note potential disadvantages that may arise from use of 
aspects of the techniques presented herein.  Such disadvantages may include, for example: 
 One or more middle boxes may not honor the identified extension and either 
drop it or not do anything with it. 
 An extension may become lengthy depending upon what information an entity 
chooses to include in it. 
In summary, techniques have been presented herein that support an extension to the 
handshake protocol that can request a ‘trace’ feature along a network path.  All of the 
different TLS entities in the network can recognize the extension and add any changes that 
they are making to the upstream proposal.  Advantages of the techniques presented herein 
include, among other things, helping to troubleshoot the TLS policy end-to-end. 
5
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4574 [2021]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4574
